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Techno-aesthetic Thinking. Technicity and 
Symbolism in the Body1
Anna Caterina Dalmasso
Centre Prospéro. Langage, image et connaissance, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles
Abstract. This paper investigates the reciprocal implications between aesthetics and 
technics, to show how technicity, as a cultural and symbolic attitude, is constitutively 
rooted in the aesthetic dimension of human experience. The analysis conducted aims 
to bring into focus the originarity of technicity in the development of the living body, 
understood in its inseparable connection with the mind, as junction between the sensi-
ble and the symbolic, the organic and the cultural, the perceptive and the expressive. I 
address this question through a parallel analysis of Simondon’s groundbreaking reflec-
tion on technics and the less explored account of technics in Merleau-Ponty’s philoso-
phy. If the latter inscribes our attitude towards technics in the motricity and symbol-
ism inherent to the living body, the former ascribes to aesthetics a form of thinking, 
thus playing a fundamental role in our relationship to the technical dimension. Despite 
the differences in their approach to technics, I combine their theoretical perspectives to 
encompass their internal limits and to outline possible convergences. 
Keywords. Technics, techno-aesthetics, aesthetic thinking, Merleau-Ponty, Simondon.
1Technology is our culture.
Jarod Lanier
Seulement à travers l’initiation au savoir technique 
et la parallèle reconnaissance de la valeur culturelle et symbolique des objets 
techniques, 
la culture pourra parvenir à une compréhension de leur mode d’existence 
et apaiser le malaise social qui hante le rapport entre l’homme et la machine.
Gilbert Simondon
1 This article stems from the research I developed thanks to the ACRI Young 
Investigator Training Program 2017, and presented in the International Con-
ference «From the Aesthetic Mind to the Symbolic Mind» at University of 
Florence. I would like to thank Professor Pina De Luca, who supervised me 
in the carrying of this project, for her support and encouragement, along with 
Professor Fabrizio Desideri who directed the ACRI project and conference, for 
inviting me to participate and for making possible an outstanding scientific 
exchange.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Because of the increasingly pervasive presence 
of technology in our lives, the question of tech-
nics, and especially that of its relationship to sen-
sibility, has become crucial under many respects. 
Technological devices, as well as the cultural and 
epistemological dispositives they produce, work as 
prosthesis for human sensibility and expand the 
capacities of the intersubjective sphere, entailing 
political and biopolitical issues and affecting our 
embodied existence.
The coupling of body and technologies has 
never been as evident as in the last decades, by 
virtue of the diffusion of portable and wearable 
devices as well as virtual and augmented real-
ity technologies. As has been pointed out, such a 
massive exteriorisation of human capacities2 into 
technologies could also entail the risk of a dema-
terialization of embodied experience and even 
engender a progressive «insensibilisation» of our 
perceptive, cognitive and relational functions3. In 
other words, the risk intrinsic to our contempo-
rary technoculture would be that of disembodi-
ment, i.e. an elision of the living body’s presence, 
as the enhancement of bodily functions which 
technology provides is likely to threaten the very 
existence and integrity of the living body as we 
know it.
Yet, can we assume such a premise from 
a philosophical point of view? Isn’t the body 
what ultimately enables our aesthetic and cogni-
tive experiences, even virtual ones? And isn’t the 
human body structured in such a way as to extend 
itself into organic artefacts and prosthesis, being 
exposed, «altered» and dispossessed of any sup-
posed natural authenticity?4 Indeed, although the 
digital revolution has brought forth unprecedented 
configurations, we still tend to describe the pre-
sent technological condition by means of catego-
2 On the notion of technics as «exteriorisation» see Leroi-
Gourhan (1964); McLuhan (1964).
3 About these questions see for example Hayles (1999); 
Milon (2005); Small (2008); Meirieu, Kambouchner, Stie-
gler (2012); Tisseron (2013), (2017).
4 See Montani (2014).
ries of the past, such as subject/object, activity/
passivity, nature/culture, etc. To encompass this 
dualism, we need a theoretical paradigm that ena-
bles us to understand our embodied experience in 
its essential connection – rather than in its sup-
posed opposition – to our technoculture.
Technologies should never be considered in 
isolation, since they exist only in relation to the 
interminglings of bodies and society that they 
make possible or that make them possible. In his 
account of human technicity, Leroi-Gourhan, 
makes no essential distinction between the tool 
as technical organ and the organ as bodily ele-
ment: a technical object, such as a biface, emerges 
from the sensible matter in the same way as the 
hand does, insofar as both are a «secretion of the 
body and the brain» (Leroi-Gourhan [1964]: 132; 
Leroi-Gourhan [1993]). Thus, technicity shall be 
thought of not as something that is merely added 
onto a «natural» core of embodied life, but rather 
in its mutual implication with sensibility, i.e. in 
its relationship with the development and histori-
cal evolution of the living body, understood, in its 
inseparable connection with the mind, as junction 
between the sensible and the symbolic, the organic 
and the cultural, the perceptive and the expressive. 
This is why a cross-examination of technology 
and especially of embodied technics is essential to 
account for the anthropological transformations 
that are afoot in contemporary technoculture.
In order to address such questions in a com-
prehensive manner, contemporary philosophi-
cal and non-philosophical studies have frequently 
turned to the groundbreaking observations of Gil-
bert Simondon, providing a wide account of tech-
nicity and of its long neglected cultural relevance 
(Simondon [1958]; [2014]). In this paper, I would 
like to challenge Simondon’s fascinating perspec-
tive through a parallel analysis of both his account 
of technicity and the reflections Maurice Merleau-
Ponty devoted to the expressivity and symbolism 
of the phenomenal body (Merleau-Ponty [1942]; 
[1945]; [1961]; [1994]; [2011]).
Certainly, Merleau-Ponty is not a «philoso-
pher of technology» and is not known for having 
developed a systematic account of technics; nev-
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ertheless, as some commentators have begun to 
show (Ihde [1990]; Guchet [2001], [2010]; Hans-
en [2006]; Hoel and Carusi [2015]; Slock [2016]), 
his philosophy allows us to sketch out, if not an 
organic reflection on technics, at least a set of very 
productive and operational concepts to think of 
it. And, perhaps, the apparently arbitrary opera-
tion – namely addressing a phenomenology of the 
body in search for the elements of a philosophy of 
technicity – can also be read as a cultural symp-
tom that reveals the necessity to account for the 
connection between sensibility and technics in the 
present historical situation – whereas a different 
time might have possibly explored the body from 
the perspective of a doctrine of the passions, of a 
theory of beauty, or of the sacred.
In this paper I aim not only to emphasize pos-
sible connections between Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Simondon’s thoughts, but rather to shed light on 
the specific conception of our relationship to tech-
nology developed by the two philosophers whilst 
also attempting to encompass their internal lim-
its by combining their works. This parallel analy-
sis will allow us to investigate how technicity, as 
a cultural and symbolic attitude, is rooted in the 
aesthetic dimension of human experience, being 
even a constitutive part of it.
2. TECHNICIZATION OF THOUGHT AND THE 
THINKING OF TECHNICS 
If we examine Merleau-Ponty’s approach of 
technics, it may appear ambivalent: on the one 
hand, the philosopher strongly opposes a techni-
cization of thought (Guchet [2001]) that proceeds 
from mechanistic science, but, on the other hand, 
he considers technology as a non-philosophical 
field whose symbolic and cultural significance 
calls for a philosophical investigation, opening up 
new paths for philosophy.
In The Structure of Behaviour, the philoso-
pher firmly opposes scientific approaches that 
understand nature and the human being based on 
the model of the machine, resulting in a science 
that, as he would later argue in Eye and Mind, 
«manipulates things and gives up dwelling in 
them» (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 9; Merleau-Ponty 
[2007]: 368). Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s goal is to criti-
cize a theory of behaviour that leans on a causal-
ist relationship between stimuli and reactions, as 
it reduces the human being to a mechanism and 
misses the excess of meaning that the living body 
and the environment always involve. On the con-
trary, he addresses the notion of life and behav-
iour as linked to the historical and embodied situ-
ation of living beings, that is, the reciprocal and 
complex relationship between the organism and 
the environment.
Merleau-Ponty examines multifarious exam-
ples drawn from the technical domain to support 
his arguments against a mechanistic conception 
of thought, a perspective that ultimately complies 
with Heideggerian critique of the instrumental 
conception of technology (Heidegger [1954]). At 
the same time, we notice that more often, Mer-
leau-Ponty’s argument relies on phenomenologi-
cal descriptions of technical devices, which are 
understood as correlatives of the configuration of 
the human body and its excessive structure. The 
analysis of technical artefacts, especially optical 
devices such as the mirror – I will come back to 
this point later in the text – , is set forth in order 
to bring into focus the living body’s perceptive 
structures. Hence, in these cases, far from being 
put in contrast to human perception, technology 
is precisely that which can reveal the functioning 
of sensibility, which is normally dissimulated and 
dwells unnoticed in our ordinary perception.
The essay Cinema and the New Psychology 
is an emblematic example of this process. In this 
famous conference from 1945, Merleau-Ponty 
takes into account the technical invention of cin-
ema to clarify the functioning of our perception; 
indeed, he outlines a parallel between the struc-
ture of our ordinary perception and the techni-
cal–cinematic perception, in which the intrinsic 
operation of the cinematic apparatus is employed 
to support the thesis of Gestalt Psychology, against 
the empiricist theories of perception. Moreover, in 
the conference, Merleau-Ponty suggests that, once 
invented, any technical instrument – in this case 
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the machine of the cinematographer, which allows 
to register and project moving images – needs to 
be taken on and almost invented a second time by 
culture – so that the moving images become what 
we commonly refer to as «cinema» (Merleau-Pon-
ty [1948]: 61-75; Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 48-59).
Therefore, despite arguing against a techniciza-
tion of thought, in developing his main philosoph-
ical goals, Merleau-Ponty seems to pursue another 
direction of research, in which technology comes 
into play as an ally of philosophy. Let us further 
examine this (only apparently) contradictory 
aspect of his approach.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of technics must be 
inscribed in the framework of two main concerns 
that occupy his philosophical research, namely 
the relationship between nature and culture on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the account and 
formulation of the notion of body schema or body 
image5, which serves as a theoretical basis for 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of technicity and 
its relationship to sensibility.
From his initial works, Merleau-Ponty refus-
es the nature/culture opposition and the idea of 
nature as a separate entity. He aims to show that 
«what we call nature is already consciousness of 
nature» (Merleau-Ponty [1942]: 199; Merleau-
Ponty [1964]: 212). The whole research developed 
in Phenomenology of Perception can be read as the 
effort to inscribe the problem of nature in the his-
toricity and symbolism that is inherent to the liv-
ing body. Nature is not behind us as an unreach-
able dimension that we might eventually access 
if we managed to get «beyond» culture. Rather, 
nature is the background on which human beings 
live and it is the source of an excess of sense. As 
5 For a discussion of the notion of «body image» in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s philosophy and its sources, see Saint Aubert 
(2015); Saint Aubert (2006); Weiss (1999); Mazzù (2001). 
In Merleau-Ponty’s writings no theoretical distinction can 
be tracked between «body image» and «body schema». 
As Saint Aubert discusses in detail, the philosopher takes 
on this notion from Gestalt psychology and especially 
the work of psychiatrist Paul Schilder (Schilder [1923]; 
[1935]) and creatively reinterprets it in the perspective of 
his own philosophical reflection.
Merleau-Ponty puts it, what characterizes human 
beings is «not the capacity to create a second 
nature – economic, social, cultural – beyond their 
biological nature, but rather the possibility to 
overcome their given structures for creating new 
ones» (Merleau-Ponty [1942]: 199; Merleau-Ponty 
[1964]: 184). Such possibility relies on the capac-
ity of the human body that becomes particularly 
remarkable if we observe the movement of dila-
tation of perception (Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 262; 
Merleau-Ponty [1968]: 212), which is afoot in our 
embodied relationship to instruments and tech-
nologies.
Merleau-Ponty describes the operational 
organisation of the phenomenal body through the 
notion of body image, to be understood as a men-
tal design, supporting the living body’s memory, 
spatiality and motility, which is experienced pro-
prioceptively and dynamically and through which 
my body is geared onto the world. This is to say 
that, even before being involved in action and 
movement, the body is already engaged in their 
virtual projection. Like, for instance, in the experi-
ence of vision, in which we do not only perceive 
the objects and the landscape in their respective 
features, but we also seize the potentialities and 
relationships which are woven into the parts of the 
landscape, or between the landscape and me as 
embodied subject.
Hence, in their intentional relationship with 
human sensibility, things cease to be mere objects 
and become instead «quasi-organs» (Saint Aubert 
[2015]: 107), contributing to our being open to 
the world and realizing an «extension of exist-
ence» (Merleau-Ponty [1945]: 178; Merleau-Pon-
ty [2005]: 135). This process can otherwise be 
described as «habit», expressing the power of our 
body of «dilating our being-in-the-world» and 
«changing our existence by appropriating instru-
ments» (Merleau-Ponty [1945]: 168; Merleau-Pon-
ty [2005]: 127).
Thus, as Don Ihde has pointed out, in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s account of body image there is an 
implicit «latent phenomenology of instrumen-
tation» (Ihde [1990]: 40), that is, a theory of the 
process by which the body operates both a techni-
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cal exteriorisation of its functions and an incorpo-
ration of the technical tools. The way we get used 
to technical objects and artefacts is to be trans-
planted into them, or conversely, to incorporate 
them into the bulk of our own body.
Furthermore, for Merleau-Ponty, the relation-
ship to instruments can better clarify the very 
nature of body image, for it shows that the image 
that we have of our body does not just delimit its 
edges and position into space, defining a static 
position of our body as res extensa. On the con-
trary, the body image operates as a virtual system, 
open to possibility and always ready to be trans-
formed, as it creatively integrates in and realigns 
itself to it. The philosopher provides different 
examples to explain how the body image behaves 
and adapts plastically, incorporating technical 
objects in its actions. Thanks to its virtual power, 
the body can both integrate objects in its own spa-
tiality and extend itself through artefacts6, as we 
observe the way in which «a woman may, without 
any calculation, keep a safe distance between the 
feather in her hat and things which might break it 
off» for «she feels where the feather is just as we 
feel where our hand is» (Merleau-Ponty [1945]: 
167; Merleau-Ponty [2005]: 126). The same can be 
said if one notices that, when I am driving a car, I 
am able to «enter a narrow opening and see that 
I can “get through” without comparing the width 
of the opening with that of the wings, just as I go 
through a doorway without checking the width of 
the doorway against that of my body» (Merleau-
Ponty [1945]: 167; Merleau-Ponty [2005]: 128).
An even more evident example is the way a 
blind person no longer perceives their white cane 
for itself, as it has progressively become for them 
an area of sensitivity in their exploration of the 
world, as it extends through its range of action 
«the scope and active radius of touch and pro-
viding a parallel to sight» – or rather what can 
6 Merleau-Ponty makes no essential distinction between 
the process of incorporation and extension that charac-
terise our use of technology, and rather considers them as 
two complementary movements. For a discussion of the 
distinction between body-extension and body-incorpora-
tion see De Preester & Tsakiris (2009); Parisi (2019).
be transposed by sighted persons as a parallel to 
sight7.
Human beings are characterized by a vir-
tual relationship with their environment, by their 
capacity of «orienting oneself in relation to the 
possible, to the mediate» (Merleau-Ponty [1942]: 
190; Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 176), of projecting 
themselves into the future and the past, constantly 
transcending their goals. This capacity of the body 
to systematically overcome its merely «biological» 
possibilities and its tendency to virtually project 
itself, which we might also call imagination8, is for 
Merleau-Ponty what distinguishes human behav-
iour from that of other animals in the relation 
towards technical objects.
Thus, technics is understood as a symbolic and 
cultural projection or as the excess of sense with-
in our «natural» embodied and adaptive actions, 
precisely in this perspective, technical objects are 
for Merleau-Ponty an expression – just as, accord-
ing to him, perception is in itself expressive (Mer-
leau-Ponty [2011]: 48 ss.) – insofar as they express 
the human being by expressing things9. In other 
7 «The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for 
him and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has 
become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and 
active radius of touch and providing a parallel to sight. In 
the exploration of things, the length of the stick does not 
enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather 
aware of it through the position of objects than of the 
position of objects through it. The position of things is 
immediately given through the extent of the reach which 
carries him to it, which comprises, besides the arm’s 
reach, the stick’s range of action» (Merleau-Ponty [1945]: 
167; Merleau-Ponty [2005]: 127). 
The example of the so-called «blind man’s stick» has been 
discussed in literature: see Polanyi (1966) and Bateson 
(1973). For more recent contributions see: Malafouris 
(2008) and (2013); De Preester & Tsakiris (2009). In par-
ticular, Malafouris has discussed the implications of the 
philosophical problem of the blind man’s stick for archae-
ology of mind, in the attempt of redrawing the bounda-
ries between brains, bodies and things, which has become 
particularly timely due to recent advances in the study of 
brain plasticity.
8 See Montani (2014): 33 ss.
9 About the notion of expression see Slatman (2003), 
Kristensen (2010), Fóti (2013).
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words, human artefacts involve a certain experi-
ence of the world, and thereby they incorporate 
an anthropological and historical significance. 
What the philosopher seeks to describe through 
the notion of expression is the reciprocal, two-
way movement between culture and the sensible-
aesthetic dimension, as they constitutively overlap 
each other, the aesthetic conducts being informed 
– even if not determined – by the social and 
cultural sphere, and the cultural systems being 
inflected and constantly reconfigured by the sym-
bolic, which is not simply potentially present, but 
already expressed within the aesthetic contact with 
the world.
The meaning of actions, objects of use, and 
more generally all human products, never coin-
cides for Merleau-Ponty with the simple results 
and functions connected to them, but it is always 
entangled with a cultural significance that goes 
beyond them. Thus, for human beings the act of 
dressing, originated to defend oneself from the 
cold or atmospheric agents, entails «the act of 
adornment or also of modesty and thus reveals 
a new attitude toward oneself» (Merleau-Ponty 
[1942]: 188; Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 174). The same 
can be observed with regard to houses, in which 
human beings project and realize their tastes and 
values. And language itself can be understood as 
being but a further articulation of this movement 
of symbolic projection of adaptive actions. 
3. AESTHETIC THINKING AND THE CULTURE 
OF TECHNOLOGY
As we have seen, although technicization of 
thought appears to be an obstacle, for Merleau-
Ponty technics in itself is not «extraphilosophi-
cal», on the contrary, it appears to be «full of phi-
losophy» (Guchet [2001]). Techniques and instru-
ments are anthropological phenomena revealing 
a whole universe of significations that must be 
investigated by philosophy. As Merleau-Ponty 
repeatedly claims in his writings and especial-
ly in his late Collège de France course notes, the 
advancement of technology and the development 
of modern physics are just as in art, literature or 
cinema, a permanent call to philosophy and to its 
renewal (Guchet [2001]; Merleau-Ponty [1996]).
Merleau-Ponty believes that «modes of 
thought correspond to technical methods» (Mer-
leau-Ponty [1948]: 75; Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 59). 
This is why philosophy needs to investigate tech-
nologies and more in general technical objects as 
anthropological facts able to revive and question 
philosophical reflection. Thus, for example, mod-
ern technologies and science urge philosophi-
cal thinking to reckon with the cultural meaning 
that is expressed by them, although in an indirect 
and non-conceptual way. This is why a philosophi-
cal investigation of the cultural meaning of technol-
ogy is complementary to the project of formulating 
a new ontology, whereas most of the science and 
culture of the time, at the dawn of the Sixties, 
tended to rely upon the ontological premises of 
Cartesian representationalism (see Merleau-Pon-
ty [1948]; Merleau-Ponty [1964], Merleau-Ponty 
[1968]).
Merleau-Ponty elicits a sort of «unthought» 
in the manifestations of modern technology, and 
he prompts philosophy to reckon with it (Mer-
leau-Ponty [1996]: 391 ss). This line of research 
has since been pursued by Gilbert Simondon, in 
particular by his account of the mode of exist-
ence of technical objects, to which he devoted his 
thèse complémentaire (Simondon [1958]). Indeed, 
Simondon seems to have taken on Merleau-Pon-
ty’s suggestion to investigate the spiritual – i.e. the 
invisible – characters of technologies. The goal of 
Simondon’s extensive analysis is precisely to shed 
light on the cultural significance of technics and to 
raise awareness of the cultural meaning of techni-
cal objects, which Modern Western thought seems 
to have denied by refusing or neglecting technical 
realities as essentially human (Simondon [1958]: 
9).
Simondon constantly points out the existence 
of a gap, of a dramatic divergence between the 
advances in techno-sciences and the actual state 
of culture: by neglecting the meaning and human 
genesis of technical objects, established theory has 
ended up drawing an opposition between human 
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beings and machines. This has prevented con-
sidering technical objects as «mediators between 
man and nature», or, according to Merleau-Ponty’s 
view mentioned above, as «expressions»; that is, 
embodied phenomena, able to reveal anthropo-
logical significance (Merleau-Ponty [2011]: 48). 
For Simondon, the rushing search for supremacy, 
that leads technical progress, stems from an ide-
alisation of technics, resulting in a mythical and 
purely imaginary conception of the machine as a 
threat that needs to be questioned and undone by 
philosophy.
Moreover, besides the fact that technical 
objects always include an anthropological signifi-
cance – insofar as they are the product of human 
creativity – they also maintain «a certain margin 
of indetermination» (Simondon [1958]), a notion 
which represents one of the most original and 
decisive aspects of Simondon’s reflection on tech-
nical objects. Indeed, in the process of their pro-
duction, technical objects incorporate part of the 
natural world, which works as a condition of its 
functioning and, at the same time, provides them 
with a certain degree of independence, so that 
they are always open to contingency and to the 
unexpected10.
A technical invention or creation is never con-
cluded in itself. Indeed, once the technical object 
has reached a certain configuration, in the pro-
cess that Simondon defines as concretisation, it still 
maintains an open structure likely to assume new 
assemblages and organisations. Similarly, we have 
seen that, with regard to the cinematic apparatus, 
Merleau-Ponty argued that «after the technical 
instrument has been invented, it must be taken up 
10 For Simondon, the level of development of techni-
cal objects depends entirely on this margin of indeter-
mination: «En fait, l’automatisme est un assez bas degré 
de perfection […]. Le véritable perfectionnement des 
machines, celui dont on peut dire qu’il élève le degré 
de technicité, correspond non pas à un accroissement 
de l’automatisme, mais au contraire, au fait que le fonc-
tionnement d’une machine recèle une certaine marge 
d’indétermination. C’est celle-ci qui permet à la machine 
d’être sensible à une information extérieure» (Simondon 
[1958]: 12).
by an artistic will, as it were, re-invented» (Mer-
leau-Ponty [1948]: 75; Merleau-Ponty [1964]: 59).
Now, what is particularly noteworthy is that 
for Simondon the virtual possibilities of technics 
hinge precisely on the aesthetic dimension, which 
has to be understood as the common ground of 
both artistic expressions and the developments of 
technology and modern science. As I will argue, 
under Simondon’s pen, the notion of aesthetics 
ranges different definitions: from an understand-
ing of aesthetics as theory or philosophy of art, to 
a more comprehensive perspective that – follow-
ing Baumgarten (1750) – entails the whole spec-
trum of sensibility and extends the definition of 
aesthetics to the exchanges between nature and 
human beings, that are also enabled by technical 
objects.
In the third part of his book On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects, entitled «The 
Essence of Technicity»11, Simondon develops a 
symbolic history of the three different modes of 
being-in-the-world proper of humans – magi-
cal phase, religious phase, technical phase –, to be 
thought of as successive individuations of a met-
astable system that describes the relationship of 
human beings to the environment (Simondon 
[2005]). In the first mode of existence, the rela-
tion of human beings to the world comes about in 
an elementary structuration, corresponding to the 
emergence of the «distinction between figure and 
ground in the universe» (Simondon [1958]: 156), 
which precedes the separation between subject 
and object. The human being experiences a primi-
tive unity with the world; yet, this environment 
or milieu is not continuous nor undifferentiated, 
since a «reticulation» of points emerges which 
institutes salient moments and places as «key-
points» (Simondon [1958]: 229) and polarities, 
having a sort of magical pregnancy, in which the 
capacity of the world to influence human beings is 
concentrated (Simondon [1958]: 164). This is the 
11 About Simondon’s account of technics see Barthélé-
my (2005); Guchet (2010); Carozzini (2011); “Critique” 
(2015); “Cahiers Simondon” (2015). About Simondon’s 
conception of aesthetics see Michaud (2012). 
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case with geographical sites – such as mountains, 
summits, promontories, gorges, the heart of the 
forest – and points in time – such as beginnings, 
inaugurations, strong transitions and passages –, 
which are able to give rhythm to becoming and 
regulate exchanges between the human being and 
the world.
The constitution of the technical phase and 
of the religious phase proceeds from the rupture 
of this initial structure (Simondon [1958]: 233), 
in which the key-points distinguish themselves 
from the structure. The primitive unity of the liv-
ing being and the milieu are split apart, result-
ing in a phase-shift [déphasage] of the primitive 
magical mode of existence. Structure and ground 
are undone and a certain distance is introduced 
between human beings and the world. Such 
emerging distance is mediatised by technics, on 
the one hand, and by religion on the other, which 
are to be understood as two interdependent poles.
As the primitive unity of the living and its 
environment is divided, it becomes objectivated 
by technics and subjectivated by religion. While 
technics (objective pole), with an analytic attitude, 
extracts fragments and isolates objects from the 
world to act upon it, allowing human beings to 
relate efficaciously to it, conversely, religion (sub-
jective) represents the quest for totality and tran-
scendence, trying to restore an absolute unity.
Simondon tries to avoid too dialectical a struc-
ture, which risks reducing and theoretically weak-
ening the heuristic power of his description of the 
phase-shift. In a way, the anti-dialectical and met-
astable structure of the three modes of existence is 
provided by the aesthetic dimension. With respect 
to the results of this phase-shift, the aesthetic 
thought or aesthetic thinking [pensée esthétique]12 
acts as «a permanent reminder of the rupture of 
the unity of the magical mode of existence and 
the striving for future unity» (Simondon [1958]: 
12 I prefer this second translation to express the dynamic 
and inchoative nature of what Simondon calls «pensée 
esthétique», that should not be confused with the aesthet-
ic reflection, but embraces a dimension which precedes 
any aesthetic jugment or aesthetic discourse. 
160), and presents itself as the possibility to recon-
stitute the totality of the reticular universe, where 
humans experience the world directly without 
separation between subject and object. By build-
ing analogical relations, aesthetic thinking aims 
to recompose unity, since it creates continuity and 
universality, preventing the isolation of thought 
from itself (Simondon [1958]: 248).
Thus, aesthetic thinking allows us to estab-
lish continuities between the human being and 
the milieu, since every aesthetic action ultimately 
consists in constituting noteworthy and salient 
points. Those are no longer inserted in a primitive 
magical unity, but in the universe that has resulted 
from the differentiation of the magical world, into 
technical world and religious world. In Simondon’s 
perspective, then, aesthetic thinking is not simply 
related to works of art and artistic practice, given 
that every act, thing, or moment «can become a 
noteworthy point of this sort, all can therefore be 
“aestheticized”» (Michaud [2012]: 124). Inversely, 
we should rather understand the very existence 
of artistic products as resting upon the ability of 
human beings «to feel the aesthetic impression 
with regard to real and vital situations» (Simon-
don [1958]: 248). The ultimate function of art is to 
preserve and develop this decisive human capacity.
Before bringing into focus Simondon’s account 
of aesthetic thinking, we need to point out that, in 
the first place, the aesthetic dimension does not 
pertain to the properties of aesthetic objects or 
aspects of reality, nor does it define a subjective 
judgment or point of view, but rather stays some-
where at the intersection between them, as that 
which lays the basis for the sensible and symbolic 
encounter between human beings and the world. 
Secondly, as long as the notion of «aesthetic think-
ing» situates aesthetics in the domain of thought 
and Simondon connects it to the «aesthetic 
impression», this does not subordinate aesthetics 
to linguistic practices nor to the formulation of an 
aesthetic judgment. In fact, as Simondon argues, 
an aesthetic impression is independent from the 
real presence of an aesthetic – or artistic – object 
and can embrace every human experience (Simon-
don [1958]: 249). Hence, for instance, technical 
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objects can have aesthetic value and can be said to 
be beautiful (Simondon [1958]: 254), not because 
of their ornament and decoration, such as when 
the external case or the shape of the object aims 
at concealing its technical features (cryptotechnic 
tendency)13, but precisely by virtue of their tech-
nicality (phanerotechnic tendency), and of their 
insertion in the milieu: 
the technical object is not beautiful in just any cir-
cumstances; it is beautiful when it encounters a singu-
lar and notable place of the world. The high-tension 
lines when they are crossing valleys, the car when is 
steering, the train when it leaves or comes out of the 
tunnel […]. The technical object is beautiful when it 
encounters a ground that agrees with it, of which it 
can be the proper figure, that is, when it completes 
and expresses the world (Simondon [1958]: 185).
By virtue of the aesthetic impression that it 
can evoke, technics comes to creatively reintegrate 
into nature the objects that it had separated from 
it and therefore objectified. Through the aesthet-
ic dimension, technics surpasses itself by creat-
ing new noteworthy points, able to re-signify and 
amplify the feeling of the coupling between the 
human being and the environment, or between 
nature and human artefacts. Simondon’s reflec-
tion on technics provides a theoretical frame-
work to undo too narrow a separation between 
the technical environment and the natural world, 
the process of insertion providing and implying 
the possibility of a permanent reactivation of the 
critical and symbolic functions in what he calls 
the «associated milieu». Still, in his first account of 
technicity the relationship between sensibility and 
technology is not developed further by the philos-
opher. 
13 «S’opposant au mouvement phanérotechnique de 
manifestation de la technicité, relève d’une tentative de 
déguisement finalisée à faire pénétrer l’objet technique, à 
le faire accepter, au sein de la «citadelle de la culture», en 
l’obligeant pour ainsi dire à porter un “voile”», (Simon-
don [2014] “Psychosociologie de la technicité [1960-
1961]”: 37).
4. TECHNO-AESTHETICS IS SAID IN MANY 
WAYS
As we have seen, according to Simondon, the 
«aesthetic impression», or the sentiment of beau-
ty that is connected to it, depends on the gesture 
of inserting an object in a milieu, such as to dis-
close unexpressed potentialities and to produce 
new individuations. The aesthetic impression is 
the result of an operation of cutting and editing 
or of assemblage that, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, 
proceeds from the generative gap [écart] that is at 
work in the sensible14. In this perspective, aesthetic 
thinking and technical thinking cannot be sepa-
rated; on the contrary, they combine in the process 
that allows the emergence of the different articula-
tions of the relationship between the human being 
and the world. Aesthetic thinking is precisely what 
makes the activation of a margin of virtual action 
possible, specific to every technical artefact; such 
margin ensures that the technical object can be 
put into circulation within the cultural dimension, 
thus mediatising the production of sense – in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s terms the operation of «expression» – 
which is always afoot in technology.
Simondon’s theoretical gesture seeks to define 
what we might call an aesthetic performativity 
inherent to technics, in order to describe the crea-
tive effects of aesthetic thinking, to be understood, 
as I suggested above, as an intrinsic property of 
the objects as much as a capacity of the embodied 
subject. Thereby, as a further step, let us now focus 
more in detail on the connection between technics 
and sensibility, to bring into focus the convergence 
between Merleau-Ponty’s and Simondon’s reflec-
tions.
This question is explicitly addressed by Simon-
don in his later thought, in a short text of 1982, 
where he lays the basis for the foundation or «axi-
omatisation» of what he proposes to define as 
«aesthetico-technics or techno-aesthetics» (Simon-
don [1982]: 379-396; [2012]). In this unfinished 
manuscript, Simondon takes on some of the ques-
14 On the notion of gap in Merleau-Ponty see Saint 
Aubert (2015).
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tions already outlined in his previous research, to 
articulate further the theoretical core of the mutu-
al relationship between technics and aesthetics. In 
Simondon’s notes, the notion of techno-aesthetics 
is addressed under different angles, as if the phi-
losopher’s argument were following – to use a 
mechanical image – the oscillations of a pendu-
lum, every movement revealing a different way to 
understand the co-implication of technics and aes-
thetics in our relationship to the world. 
The term «techno-aesthetics» is first employed 
to describe the way in which works of art or aes-
thetic objects incorporate technology, as in the 
creations of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, Fer-
nand Léger, Alexander Calder, but also Gustave 
Eiffel and Le Corbusier, among others. These 
works combine technical efficiency and beauty, 
functionality and «aesthetic power» (Simondon 
[1982]: 382; Simondon [2012]). Here, the term 
techno-aesthetics expresses the specific fashion in 
which these creations tie together art and techno-
logical avant-garde, so that the «technicized land-
scape also takes on the meaning of a work of art» 
(Simondon [1982]: 390; Simondon [2012]).
Yet, this bond between aesthetics and tech-
nics does not just concern artistic creations: even 
a water tower or a viaduct, the engine of an auto-
mobile or the specific arrangement of a clamp, 
a shear, a stepped key, can raise an aesthetic 
or techno-aesthetic impression. The first ones, 
being engineering works, do so by virtue of their 
insertion in the geographic environment, with 
which they re-establish a unity, while machines 
or instruments elicit an aesthetic feeling which 
derives from the action that is connected to their 
manipulations and functioning. Their use trig-
gers a «sensorimotoric pleasure» or «pleasure 
of action» (Simondon [2014): 383; Simondon 
[2012]), «something orgasmic», which becomes 
the «tactile means and motor of stimulation» 
when «a certain instrumentalized joy» is «mediat-
ed by the tool» (Simondon [1982]: 383; Simondon 
[2012]).
In developing such an insight, Simondon 
introduces another angle of analysis, since he out-
lines a consideration, in quasi-phenomenological 
terms, of our sensible contact with the techni-
cal object and of the ease produced by its func-
tioning and even of the pleasure that is elicited 
by its form, while we enjoy the contemplation of 
the structure and shape of an instrument, reveal-
ing through its simple visual form the balance 
between its proportions and the forces it is sup-
posed to encounter. 
Thanks to this texture of virtual potentialities, 
the tool mediatizes the relationship with the object 
on which it operates, and, conversely, the body of 
the user finds itself in the middle of a dynamic 
exchange, as it is called to perform a perceptive 
and motor response by meeting the sensory struc-
ture offered by the object. The «pleasure of action» 
produced derives from the user’s aesthetic capac-
ity, and the word «aesthetic» here is to be under-
stood in a wider sense as referring to the human 
sensorium. 
Later in the text, Simondon points out another 
aspect which is complementary to this function of 
mediation assured by the technical object, one that 
consists in eliciting the presence of physical forces 
that cannot possibly be noticed by human per-
ception. There is an «aesthetics of nature» which 
can only be perceived through technical tools or 
devices, just as electricity can only be detected by 
means of a galvanometer or by an oscilloscope. 
This shows how our relationship to the world is 
inseparable from its techno-aesthetic manifesta-
tions in the perspective of what Gaston Bachelard 
would define a phenomeno-technics (Bachelard 
[1931]).
After developing this argument, Simondon 
considers once more the productions of art, to 
address not only the aesthetic feeling, but also 
the technical aspects that concern the practice of 
artistic creation and the contact with the «matter 
that is being transformed through work» (Simon-
don [1982]: 384; Simondon [2012]). These ele-
ments are even more essentially aesthetic than the 
experience of the beholder or spectator in con-
templation of a work of art. Indeed, artists in their 
practice experience deeply the «pleasure of action» 
that Simondon describes in the notes as part and 
parcel of the process of creation. A wide range of 
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sensorial articulations – with endless variations 
depending on the subjective response of the art-
ist – arises from the encounter with artistic instru-
ments: a musician enjoys the vibration of the 
strings or the tactile feedback of fingering the keys 
of a piano, as a painter is stimulated by the viscos-
ity and stickiness of the paint they mix or spread 
on canvas, and so on.
Art cannot really be separated from its status 
of techné: «art», explains Simondon, «is not only 
the object of contemplation; for those who prac-
tice it, it’s a form of action that is a little like prac-
ticing sports» (Simondon [1982]: 384; [2012]). The 
production of artistic objects is then associated 
with a techno-aesthetic pleasure and with an «aes-
thetic affection» (Simondon [1982]: 384; [2012]). 
Such a technical tenor of art also concerns and 
can serve to describe the structure of certain art-
works, likely to be analysed in a technical perspec-
tive. Thus, for instance, a techno-aesthetic analysis 
can shed new light on the interest of Leonardo 
da Vinci’s Monalisa. The aesthetic pleasure raised 
by this famous work depends on the fact that the 
painting is «essentially plural», since it exists as a 
«superimposition of itself», insofar as it merges 
on the same canvas the beginning and the end of 
a smile, without representing its complete unfold-
ing. Since the smile is not manifest, but only 
evoked by its two extreme terms, the beholder 
experiences the inchoative process linking the two 
moments. The painting conveys the superimposi-
tion of two techniques, explains Simondon, such 
as when in palimpsests one needs two messages in 
order to infer the source-message, which remains 
absent in itself.
More generally, for the philosopher, «no object 
is indifferent to our aesthetic need» (Simon-
don [1982]: 384-385, [2012]). Rather, aesthetics, 
understood as aisthesis, affects and determines 
the whole spectrum of our behaviour. At this 
point, the philosopher introduces a «more primi-
tive, more fully physical sense» of techno-aesthet-
ics (Simondon [1982]: 386, [2012]). Simondon 
argues that between aesthetics and technics there 
is «intercategorial fusion»: «[t]he techno-aesthetic 
feeling seems to be a category that is more primi-
tive than the aesthetic feeling alone, or than the 
technical aspect considered from the angle of 
functionality alone (which is an impoverishing 
perspective)» (Simondon [1982]: 391-392, [2012]).
Thus, if in the first part of his notes «On 
techno-aesthetics», Simondon seems to fluctuate 
between a Baumgartian sense of aesthetics and 
one that understands aesthetics as theory of art 
or beauty, in this passage, he articulates a much 
more radical conception, overcoming the previous 
definitions of aesthetics, to embrace the cultural 
and historically rooted nature of aisthesis as the 
dimension of our sensible contact with the world.
In order to explain how techno-aesthetics 
deeply affects our practices and existence, Simon-
don evokes a striking example, by referring to the 
research carried out in India by the Food Research 
Institute, an organisation aiming to develop a 
«basic food», which could be produced easily and 
in high quantities to be distributed to the popula-
tion in case of famine. Despite the food’s formula 
having been finalised, researchers still needed to 
find the most suitable shape for the food, so as to 
engender the adapted conditioning and allow the 
different ethnic and cultural groups in India to 
accept the product without obstacles. Indeed, in 
a region where common food is based on wheat, 
the population will not easily welcome rice-shaped 
food, even if it is distributed freely during a fam-
ine, for it will not meet the aesthetic habits of a 
certain culture rooted in their sensible relationship 
to the world.
This example demonstrates the importance of 
the affective tenor and the «value of presentation» 
of objects, all of which is highly conditioning in 
guiding our behaviour, being notoriously exploit-
ed by commercial strategies, packaging, product 
design and so on. Thus, techno-aesthetics is also 
what inflects our practices and our choices, oper-
ating at a very deep level: «The aisthesis, the fun-
damental perceptive intuition, is part of a culture. 
It acts like a pre-selector, separating the acceptable 
from the unacceptable, and determining whether 
one will accept or refuse» (Simondon [1982]: 387, 
Simondon [2012]). Through this analysis, Simon-
don comes to shed light on the «milieu of tools, 
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instruments, institutions that mould my way of 
thinking», whose importance had already been 
emphasized by Merleau-Ponty in his 1949-1952 
Courses at the Sorbonne to point out their philo-
sophical value (Merleau-Ponty [1988]).
5. EMBODIED TECHNICS AND THE 
«TECHNIQUES OF THE BODY»
As we have seen, techno-aesthetics is said in 
many ways, which should be interpreted in con-
nection to the different meanings that the notion 
of aesthetics can assume15. In the articulation of 
this concept defining the co-implication of tech-
nicity and sensibility, Simondon seems to con-
verge with some of Merleau-Ponty’s reflections 
about human perception and its historicity, since 
they both urge us to think of the human body as 
already inserted in an environment filled by vir-
tual actions and potentialities. As I argued above, 
for Merleau-Ponty technicity expresses the virtual-
ity of the human body, its capacity to extend and 
project itself into embodied significations; some-
thing which concerns both human techniques 
and works of art, Merleau-Ponty having mainly 
devoted his research to the latter, so as to show 
the reciprocal relationship between sense and sen-
sibility.
In a way, we could argue that, if the author of 
Phenomenology of Perception did not devote a spe-
cific study to the nature of technics, it is because, 
for him, technicity as such is always latently 
inscribed in the flesh as an amplification and ema-
nation of the structure of human aisthesis, and 
specifically of the constitutive gap in the sensible 
of the flesh as a texture of differentiations16.
This is particularly striking if we consider the 
mirror example that Merleau-Ponty evokes in a 
passage from Eye and Mind, where we find one 
15 For an account of aesthetics as anthropological con-
stant and for a discussion of the theoretical definition of 
aesthetics in the contemporary philosophical debate see 
Desideri (2011), Desideri (2015) and Bartalesi (2017).
16 About this interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
flesh see Carbone [2011]: 42 ss.
of his most significant arguments about tech-
nics. The philosopher addresses the dispositive of 
the mirror17 and its reflective surface, which, in 
Simondon’s terms, we may define as the ultimate 
techno-aesthetic object, since it emerges at the 
intersection of the natural and the human. Indeed, 
on the one hand, the mirror incorporates a «nat-
ural» technicity, as performed by the water’s sur-
face, and on the other it enacts the perceptive and 
imaginative capacity of human beings by virtue of 
a repetition of the natural world.
It is only in connection with the reflexivity of 
the sensible that we understand the reflexivity of 
the mirror (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 33; Merleau-
Ponty [2007]: 359). The mirror can be read as the 
emblem of technics in its radical exteriorisation, 
as a projection of the human into the inorganic–
prosthesis, instruments, dispositives, etc.–but, 
equally characterizing the organic, from the pseu-
dopodium developed by the amoeba to the most 
complex biological structures: «More completely 
than lights, shadows, and reflections, the specular 
image sketches, within things, the work of vision. 
Like all other technical objects, such as tools and 
signs, the mirror has sprung up along the open 
circuit running from the seeing body to the visible 
body» (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 33; Merleau-Ponty 
[2007]: 359).
It is this techno-aesthetic mystery of the body 
that the gestures of the artist explores: 
The painter is there, strong or frail in life, but sover-
eign incontestably in his rumination on the world, 
sovereign without any other «technique» than the one 
that his eyes and hands are given by means of see-
ing, by means of painting; he is there relentless to pull 
from this world, in which the scandals and achieve-
ments of history resound, canvases which will hardly 
add to the angers or the hopes of humanity; and no 
one matters (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 15; Merleau-
Ponty [2007]: 353).
At the same time, the mirror can be said to 
perform a techno-aesthetic function, insofar as it 
17 About the mirror in Merleau-Ponty see Dufourcq 
(2011): 63 ss.; Saint Aubert (2015): 165-200.
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institutes a salient and noteworthy point, which 
allows the unification between nature and human 
beings as well as between my proprioceptive sen-
sibility and the visual surface of my own body. Let 
us examine the way Merleau-Ponty outlines what 
can be described as a «techno-aesthetic» analy-
sis of the mirror, as mediator (Simondon [1982], 
Simondon [2012]) of our relationship with the 
environment:
Through it, my outside becomes complete. Everything 
that is most secret about me passes into that face, that 
flat, closed being of which I was already dimly aware, 
from having seen my reflection mirrored in water. 
Schilder observes that, smoking a pipe before a mir-
ror, I feel the sleek, burning surface of the wood not 
only where my fingers are but also in those glorious 
fingers, those merely visible ones inside the mirror. 
The mirror’s phantom draws my flesh outside, and at 
the same time the invisible of my body can invest the 
other bodies that I see. Hence my body can include 
segments drawn from the body of others, just as my 
substance passes into them; man is a mirror for man. 
Mirrors are instruments of a universal magic that 
changes things into spectacles and spectacles into 
things, me into another and another into me. (Mer-
leau-Ponty [1961]: 33; Merleau-Ponty [2007]: 359)18.
The experience of seeing our own image in the 
mirror and, in particular, the gesture of seeing our 
body manipulating objects, described by Schilder, 
condenses the tactile and «sensorimotoric» pleas-
ure described by Simondon, a pleasure that in the 
mirror arises from the redoubling of the world 
operated by the reflective surface, working as a 
technical and prosthetic element, able to extend 
and multiply human sensibility, and, in so doing, 
to realize an exchange between the inside and 
the outside, between the human being and oth-
ers. «Every technique», writes Merleau-Ponty, «is 
a “technique of the body”. It figures and amplifies 
the metaphysical structure of our flesh» (Merleau-
Ponty [1961]: 33; Merleau-Ponty [2007]: 359).
18 The reference is to Schilder (1935). On the subject of 
mirror and mirror stage see also Lacan (1949); Lacan 
(1973); Merleau-Ponty (1988).
The specific technicity of the mirror is 
inscribed in the flesh as much as it «draws my 
flesh outside», so that even the human body–the 
body of the other–can itself become a mirror. This 
is why the mirror is a timeless pole of attraction 
for painters of different ages. In this ancient tool, 
just as in the dispositive of perspective, takes place 
the metamorphosis of the viewer and the viewed, 
«that defines both our flesh and the painter’s voca-
tion» (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 33; Merleau-Ponty 
[2007]: 359).
Therefore, on the basis of the analysis conduct-
ed, if we read Simondon in the prism of Merleau-
Ponty’s account of technics, we may even push his 
conception of techno-aesthetics further by extend-
ing it to the very structure of the human body, 
of technics in the flesh. Merleau-Ponty speaks 
of the body as the fundamental medium of our 
being open to the world, as a «machine for liv-
ing the world», of our eyes and our hands as a 
«technique» (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 15; Merleau-
Ponty [2007]: 353), not in the sense of an objec-
tified instrument, but as the virtual power that is 
inscribed in human sensibility, of which the eye 
is one of the most significant examples: «The eye 
is an instrument that moves itself, a means which 
invents its own ends; it is that which has been 
moved by some impact of the world, which it 
then restores to the visible through the traces of a 
hand» (Merleau-Ponty [1961]: 25; Merleau-Ponty 
[2007]: 356).
Thus, in this perspective, the question of tech-
nics is always implicated by Merleau-Ponty’s con-
stant interrogation of the body as both sensible 
and symbolic matter, as shown by his clear refer-
ence, even if implicit,19 to Marcel Mauss’s work. 
For the French anthropologist, to whom Merleau-
Ponty devoted a famous essay (Merleau-Ponty 
[1960]: 143-157; Merleau-Ponty [1964]:144-125), 
technicity is primarily concerned with the «tech-
niques of the body» or «bodily technique», that is, 
19 Although no reference is indicated in footnotes, the 
expression «techniques of the body», probably extremely 
familiar at the time to the philosopher’s audience and cir-
cles, is indicated in quotation marks by Merleau-Ponty. 
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with all those actions which are effective and tra-
ditional, i.e. culturally transmissed (Mauss [1936]: 
374; [2006]: 75), independently of the technologi-
cal instruments with which human beings have 
endowed themselves. Hence, an account of tech-
nical behaviour shall not be limited to the rela-
tionship with technical objects, but rather take 
into account that human beings’ «first and most 
natural technical object» is the body itself (Mauss 
[1936]: 375; [2006]: 75).
Indeed, there is nothing natural in the way 
we live and use our body. It would be completely 
inaccurate to describe the acts of walking, run-
ning, swimming, eating and even going to sleep 
as something natural, since all these gestures and 
movements require and rest upon specific tech-
niques that need to be learnt in the development of 
the organism and in life, and whose set of param-
eters vary – actually rather quickly – over the gen-
erations, being deeply influenced by the slight-
est cultural changes. The technical gesture is but 
an extension of a bodily gesture, an emanation of 
the body – or «bodily technique» in Mauss’ words 
– and, conversely, a bodily gesture is, in itself, the 
product of a certain technicity of the body, being 
brought about by biological functions, postural and 
motor possibilities and specific organs.
As we have seen, Simondon articulates the 
question of technicity not as an isolated anthro-
pological or transcendental characteristic, but as 
inseparable from the structure of human sensibil-
ity, posing the question of an «originarity» of the 
techno-aesthetic feeling. Merleau-Ponty’s reflec-
tion converges with Simondon’s in an effort of 
thinking the aesthetic and the symbolic dimension 
of technics together, and not as opposite para-
digms; however, in a more radical way he situ-
ates technicity in the fundamental structure of the 
flesh, embedding technics as a constitutive part of 
our carnal being.
Hence, in this perspective what is «original» 
is not human enhancement by technology or the 
act of delegating functions to technical objects 
or machines, but rather the ontological gap and 
internal alteration inscribed within human sen-
sibility or flesh, with regard to which technic-
ity is but an amplification, a further articulation, 
both natural and cultural. In other words, what is 
«original» is the power of the body to project itself 
in the world, to exceed itself as symbolic expres-
sion – not despite of but through the thickness of 
sensibility.
Merleau-Ponty’s and Simondon’s reflections 
set out the basis on which to think of technics not 
as the product of culture over nature, but rather 
as the expression of an aesthetic structure of the 
human mind-body system, that is, of a permanent 
interference or mediation between the sensible and 
the symbolic operated in carnal existence, inso-
far as aesthetics, to be considered as a synonym 
of techno-aesthetics, names the form itself of our 
embodied thinking.
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